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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Clapper v. Amnesty International,1 the Supreme Court will 
decide whether plaintiffs in the United States have standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 
(FAA).2 The standing issue in this case arises in the context of foreign 
intelligence and national security. The FAA broadens the 
government’s ability to conduct electronic surveillance of 
communications. Primarily, the FAA focuses on monitoring 
communications between persons in foreign countries, although 
domestic communications may be intercepted unintentionally.3 
Amnesty International et al., Plaintiffs in this case, claim that the 
FAA violates the guarantee of judicial review established by Article 
III of the Constitution and is in violation of principles of separation of 
powers because, by limiting review of specific searches, it restricts the 
FISA Court’s power of judicial review4 to general programs enacted 
under the FAA.5 Plaintiffs also claim that the FAA violates their right 
to free speech under the First Amendment and their right to due 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, No. 11-2025 (U.S. argued Oct. 29, 2011). 
 2.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), Pub. 
L. No. 110–261, 122 Stat. 2436, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881. 
 3.  See FAA § 702, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(d) (West 2012) (requiring the Attorney General, 
in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to adopt procedures reasonably 
designed to avoid targeting of persons within the United States. This assumes that despite 
reasonable precautions, some domestic person may nonetheless be targeted inadvertently). 
 4.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. 95–511, 92 Stat. 
1783, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803. The legislation created a special court (the “FISA Court”) to 
oversee actions undertaken under FISA. The legislation also established a process for 
authorization and review of actions under FISA. 
 5.  See Brief in Opposition at 14 n.9, Clapper, No. 11-1025 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2012). 
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process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it authorizes 
warrantless surveillance of United States citizens.6 Here, however, the 
Supreme Court is faced with the narrower issue of whether Plaintiffs 
can challenge the constitutionality of the FAA based on the mere risk 
that communications in the United States may be monitored under 
the FAA, even if Plaintiffs have no evidence that their 
communications are actually being monitored. 
II. FACTS 
In 2008, legal, labor, human rights, and media organizations, along 
with attorneys and journalists, brought an action challenging the 
constitutionality of the portion of the FAA that established section 
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).7 Plaintiffs 
claim that section 702 gives sweeping and unmonitored powers to the 
government to conduct surveillance on Americans’ international 
communications in violation of Article III of the Constitution, the 
principle of separation of powers, and Plaintiffs’ First and Fourth 
Amendment constitutional rights.8 Plaintiffs seek a declaration of 
unconstitutionality and an injunction against the use of section 702.9 
Section 702 of the FAA amends the procedures for surveillance 
first established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,10 
creating new procedures for authorizing surveillance of non-United 
States citizens outside of the United States.11 The changes include 
abolishing the requirement of individualized orders and diminishing 
the role of the FISA Court.12 Under the new FAA procedures, the 
 
 6.  Id. at 14. 
 7.  Amnesty Int’l v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 643–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 8.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 14. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  FISA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f) (West 2012). FISA was originally enacted in 1978 to 
regulate surveillance of communications for foreign intelligence purposes between persons in 
the United States and between persons in the United States and persons abroad. 
 11.  Compare 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a (West 2012) (describing the procedures for 
authorization for the electronic surveillance “of persons reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States”), with 50 U.S.C.A § 1805 (West 2012) (describing the findings that a 
judge must make in order to issue an order authorizing general electronic surveillance). 
 12.  Section 1881a requires the government to obtain FISA Court approval of (1) 
government certification regarding the proposed surveillance, and (2) targeting and 
minimization procedures to be used. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a. Certification requires that the 
Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence attest that the surveillance complies 
with the Fourth Amendment, does not target persons known to be located in the United States, 
and creates adequate procedures to restrain the acquisition and dissemination of information 
about people within the United States. Id. 
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FISA Court merely approves certifications rather than finding 
probable cause for monitoring, as it did under the older FISA 
procedures.13 Moreover, the FAA restricts the FISA Court to ex ante 
review of an investigation, while authorizing the Attorney General 
and the Director of National Intelligence to direct continuous 
ongoing review of both the substance and process underlying the 
investigation.14 
According to Plaintiffs, the changes that the FAA made to FISA 
give rise to violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.15 Plaintiffs 
explain that the FAA allows authorization of surveillance of foreign 
targets based on any information deemed by the government to be 
foreign-intelligence information.16 Plaintiffs further explain that their 
jobs require them to engage in communications with foreign contacts 
regarding matters that could be deemed related to foreign-
intelligence information.17 Consequently, Plaintiffs fear that their 
international communications will be intercepted under FAA 
authorization. They claim that, as a consequence of this fear, they 
have taken costly measures to protect against interception. These 
measures include traveling to meet contacts in person and avoiding 
email communications.18 
Both parties filed for summary judgment.19 Plaintiffs sought an 
injunctive order prohibiting the Government from conducting 
 
 13.  Compare 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (West 2012) (requiring, under FISA, that the 
judge determine that the target of surveillance is a “foreign power,” and noting that a United 
States person cannot be a “foreign power” or agent thereof when his actions are protected by 
the First Amendment), with 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(i)(3) (requiring, under the FAA, that the 
Court enter an order approving the certification when the request for certification complies with 
certification requirements). 
 14.  See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (authorizing review of surveillance process 
and minimization procedures before surveillance starts); id. § 1881a(l)(1) (requiring the 
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to review compliance with targeting 
and minimization procedures every six months). 
 15.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 1. 
 16.  Id. at 8. 
 17.  Id. at 15–19. Plaintiffs are attorneys, journalists, and human rights and labor 
organizations who are in constant contact with clients and witnesses abroad. Id. Journalists and 
human rights and labor organization plaintiffs claim that fear of surveillance inhibits their ability 
to cultivate new sources or obtain information from family members and potential clients. Id. 
Attorney-plaintiffs suffer from an added burden: they have a professional obligation to make 
sure that communications with clients are confidential. Id. As long as there is a possibility that 
their communications can be monitored, they are under an obligation to take additional 
measures to ensure the confidentiality of their communications. Id. 
 18.  Id. at 1617. 
 19.  Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 2431 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2012) (No. 11-2025). 
SIELSKI FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2013  3:23 PM 
54 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 8 
surveillance under the FAA;20 the Government argued that Plaintiffs 
lacked standing to challenge the facial validity of the FAA.21 The 
district court for the Southern District of New York agreed, holding 
that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not have a “personal, 
particularized, concrete injury in fact” and were not “subject to” the 
FAA.22 The district court found that Plaintiffs’ fear that their 
communications would be monitored was merely speculative and only 
“subjective[ly] chill[ed]” Plaintiffs’ rights.23 The Second Circuit 
reversed, holding that Plaintiffs have standing “[b]ecause standing 
may be based on a reasonable fear of future injury and costs incurred 
to avoid that injury.”24 The Government petitioned for en banc review, 
but was denied by a six-to-six vote.25 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Article III of the Constitution empowers the federal courts to 
hear only “cases” and “controversies.”26 Standing doctrine exists to 
determine whether a plaintiff has shown a “case” between himself and 
the defendant that warrants resolution by the court on the merits.27 A 
plaintiff must show that he has “a personal stake in the outcome” of 
the case or controversy.28 To that end, the plaintiff must show the 
three elements of standing: (1) that the plaintiff has suffered an 
injury-in-fact, (2) that a causal connection exists between the injury 
and the challenged statute, and (3) that a decision is likely to redress 
the injury.29 
An injury-in-fact may be present and ongoing, or based on 
prospective government action.30 The plaintiff must show that the 
injury, committed under the scope of the implicated statute, affects 
the plaintiff in an individualized way.31 Future injuries based on 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Amnesty Int’l v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 643–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Amnesty Int’l USA, 638 F.3d at 122. 
 25.  Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 26.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 27.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 28.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (holding that an adversarial presentation of 
the case “sharpens the presentation of the issues” in a way that leads to the best resolution of 
the constitutional question). 
 29.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 560 n.1. 
SIELSKI FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2013  3:23 PM 
2013] WHO HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE? 55 
prospective government action are only injuries-in-fact when they 
reach a certain threshold of likelihood.32 The plaintiff cannot assert a 
future injury based on a subjective fear that he will be affected by the 
government action.33 Instead, he must show that the threat of injury is 
not merely “conjectural or hypothetical” but rather “real and 
immediate.”34 Nevertheless, the anticipation of future injury may itself 
be a present injury-in-fact and be sufficient to warrant standing if the 
plaintiff can show that the anticipation is not speculative.35 
Anticipation of future injury qualifies as present injury when the 
threat of government action causes the plaintiff to refrain from some 
protected action (such as speech)36 or when it deprives the plaintiff of 
benefits he was expecting to incur (such as protection from liability or 
competitiveness in the market).37 
A plaintiff must also show that there is a causal nexus between his 
injury and the conduct being challenged.38 Yet, a plaintiff can assert a 
legal right even if he is not the target of a defendant’s action or when 
his injury is not a direct product of the defendant’s action.39 In such a 
scenario, a plaintiff can establish injury-in-fact by showing that he has 
altered or ceased constitutionally protected conduct as a reasonable 
response to the government action.40 The plaintiff must also show that 
his injury would be redressed by a favorable court decision.41 The 
judicial remedy sought must directly correct the plaintiff’s injury.42 
 
 32.  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 n.8 (1983); accord Curtis v. City of New 
Haven, 726 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he critical inquiry is the likelihood that the plaintiffs 
will be . . . assaulted.” (emphasis added)). 
 33.  See id. at 107 n.8. (“It is the reality of the threat of . . . injury that is relevant to the 
standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions.” (emphasis in original)). A 
“subjective chill” is not enough to warrant standing. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972). 
 34.  O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974). 
 35.  See id. at 498 (explaining that plaintiffs do not have standing when the possibility that 
they will be charged under the challenged statute is only speculative). 
 36.  See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476–77 (1987) (holding that the necessity of going 
on the record to request political literature injures a First Amendment right). 
 37.  See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 426 (1998) (holding that even when a 
future outcome is speculative it can create present injury by depriving the plaintiff of a present 
opportunity). 
 38.  Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973). 
 39.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (“[W]hen the plaintiff is not 
himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, 
but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”). 
 40.  Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184–85 (2000). 
 41.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
 42.  See Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618 (explaining that the legal remedy sought by the 
plaintiff, an injunction against the district attorney for refusing to prosecute the child’s father, 
would not cause the father to pay child support and redress the plaintiff’s injury). 
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing to challenge 
government surveillance in Laird v. Tatum.43 There, the United States 
Army established a program that compiled information about public 
political activities that had the potential to cause civil disorder.44 The 
information collected was readily available to the public.45 The 
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the program, asserting 
that Army surveillance of their protests imposed a “chilling effect” on 
the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.46 The Court held that the 
plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the program.47 The Court 
explained that a “chilling effect” does not arise merely from the 
knowledge of the existence of a surveillance program that potentially 
targets the plaintiffs.48 Rather, plaintiffs must present evidence that 
the program was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in a way that 
would injure the plaintiffs directly.49 The Court held that the Laird 
plaintiffs did not meet this test because the plaintiffs did not alter 
their conduct in response to government surveillance.50 Consequently, 
the plaintiffs could show only a subjective chill rather than a direct 
injury, which is not enough.51 
Although Laird addressed the test for standing in government 
surveillance cases, the circuits are split as to whether Laird established 
a separate standard for standing in surveillance cases. Some circuits 
interpret Laird to establish a heightened standard for plaintiffs who 
wish to bring a First Amendment claim in response to government 
surveillance. More precisely, both the Sixth and D.C. Circuits have 
held that Laird precludes standing in cases of government 
surveillance when the plaintiff is not the target of the regulation and 
can show only a “subjective chill” of protected rights.52 Before 
 
 43.  408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 44.  Id. at 6. 
 45.  Id. at 9. 
 46.  Id. at 3. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 11. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 9. 
 51.  Id. at 13–14 (“[A] subjective ‘chill’ [is] not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific 
present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”). A “subjective chill” occurs when a 
governmental activity restrains a plaintiff in such a way that he is deterred from engaging in 
constitutionally protected activities due to fear of repercussion. Id. at 11. 
 52.  See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 661 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the relevant factor is 
the level of restraint on the plaintiffs, “and ‘chilling’ is not sufficient restraint no matter how 
valuable the speech”); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he ‘chilling effect’ which is produced by their fear of being subjected to 
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granting standing, these circuits would first require that the plaintiff 
be directly “regulated, constrained, or compelled” by the government 
action.53 The First and Ninth Circuits, however, have held that Laird 
allows for standing in cases where the plaintiff can show that the 
challenged government conduct has reasonably led the plaintiff to 
alter his conduct, even if he was not directly targeted by the 
regulation.54 In Clapper, the Court will likely address the proper 
standard for standing in First Amendment government surveillance 
cases and resolve the circuit split. 
IV. DECISION BELOW 
In the decision below, a Second Circuit panel unanimously held 
that Plaintiffs had fulfilled the three requirements of standing: injury-
in-fact, a causal connection between the injury and the challenged 
statute, and redressability.55 The court first analyzed whether Plaintiffs 
had proven concrete injury.56 Plaintiffs argued two grounds for injury: 
(1) fear that their communications would be monitored created a 
future injury and (2) the burdens and expenses incurred to protect 
their communications created a present injury.57 
The Second Circuit explained that to prove future injury, Plaintiffs 
had to show that the “FAA creates an objectively reasonable 
likelihood that the plaintiffs’ communications are being or will be 
monitored under the FAA.”58 According to the court, if Plaintiffs’ 
“reasonable enough” interpretation of the statute leads to a 
legitimate fear of enforcement, then Plaintiffs have standing.59 
 
 
illegal surveillance and which deters them from conducting constitutionally protected activities, 
is foreclosed as a basis for standing by the Supreme Court’s holding in Laird.”). 
 53.  See NSA, 493 F.3d at 661 (“[T]o allege a sufficient injury under the First Amendment, 
a plaintiff must establish that he or she is regulated, constrained, or compelled directly by the 
government’s actions, instead of by his or her own subjective chill.”). 
 54.  See Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that Laird does not preclude standing when government surveillance causes a “distinct 
and palpable” injury); Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 230 (1st Cir. 1984) (explaining that the 
issue is “whether the [regulation] reasonably leads [the plaintiff] to believe he must conform his 
conduct to its standards”). 
 55.  Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 2431 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2012) (No. 11-2025). 
 56.  Id. at 133–34. 
 57.  Id. at 133. 
 58.  Id. at 134. 
 59.  Id. at 137 (citing Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 383 (2d Cir. 
2000)). 
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Upon examination of Plaintiffs’ asserted future injury, the court 
decided that Plaintiffs had shown that the broad monitoring allowed 
by the FAA would likely include Plaintiffs’ communications.60 The 
FAA was enacted to broaden the government’s powers under FISA 
to monitor communications related to foreign-intelligence 
information.61 The Plaintiffs’ communications were likely to be within 
the scope of communications monitored by the FAA because 
Plaintiffs’ foreign contacts are apt to be targets of surveillance—their 
contacts include individuals who are believed to be associated with 
terrorist groups, activists who oppose governments supported by the 
U.S. government, and people located in areas of interest to the U.S. 
government.62 The court concluded that Plaintiffs’ fears were “fairly 
traceable to FAA because they are based on a reasonable 
interpretation of the challenged statute and a realistic understanding 
of the world.”63 
Moreover, according to the Second Circuit, the requirements of 
FISA Court authorization did not preclude Plaintiffs’ standing.64 The 
court explained that the presence of intervening steps does not 
preclude standing unless there is a significant intervening step.65 Only 
a step that attenuates the connection between the defendant’s action 
and the plaintiff’s harm, based on the uncertainty of its completion, 
would be significant enough to defeat standing.66 The intervening 
steps presented here do not fall under that category.67 Here, it is 
reasonable to expect that the government will seek the authorization 
for surveillance.68 It is also reasonably certain that the FISA Court will 
approve the request.69 FISA Court authorization requires only a 
certification that the request for surveillance complies with basic 
procedural requirements and not a substantive analysis of each 
request. Moreover, after the FAA was enacted, only one request for 
authorization was denied by the FISA Court.70 Because it is 
 
 60.  Id. at 138. 
 61.  See id. (citing 154 CONG. REC. 769, 771 (2008) (noting that the FAA was passed 
specifically to permit surveillance that was not permitted by FISA)). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 139. 
 64.  Id. at 139–40. 
 65.  Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–26 (2007)). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
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reasonable to expect that the government would (1) apply for 
authorization for surveillance and (2) acquire that authorization from 
the FISA Court, the court stated that the certification is not a 
significant intervening step.71 
The Second Circuit thus held that Plaintiffs had a concrete fear of 
a future injury that was causally connected to the FAA. Thus, 
Plaintiffs had sufficiently shown that their imminent future injury was 
injury-in-fact for the purposes of standing.72 
Next, the court determined that Plaintiffs had standing based on 
present injury-in-fact.73 The court explained that when the 
anticipation of future injury causes present economic harm, there is 
injury-in-fact sufficient to establish the injury element of standing.74 
The court further noted that even if the injury is self-inflicted, it is still 
sufficient for the purposes of standing as long as Plaintiffs’ actions are 
reasonable responses to a concrete fear of future injury.75 After 
concluding that Plaintiffs’ fear of monitoring under the FAA was 
reasonable, the court held that Plaintiffs’ fear was concrete enough to 
warrant a finding of present injury.76 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ undisputed 
factual record showed that they incurred costs in a direct attempt to 
protect their communications from monitoring via the FAA.77 
Because there was a concrete present injury directly connected to the 
FAA, the court held that Plaintiffs had standing.78 
The court also held that despite not having been directly subject 
to government action, Plaintiffs had standing because the FAA 
reasonably caused them to alter their conduct.79 The court held that 
Plaintiffs had shown that if the FAA can reasonably be expected to 
lead to monitoring of Plaintiffs’ communications, the monitoring may 
lead to additional injuries such as potential harm to clients and breach 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 140. 
 73.  Id. at 133. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See id. at 134 (holding that when plaintiffs can show that “it was not unreasonable for 
them to incur cost out of fear” of interception, then measures taken support standing, but 
measures do not support standing when the “possibility of interception is remote or fanciful”). 
 76.  See id. (“[T]he line of future-injury standing cases provides a helpful framework for 
analyzing plaintiffs’ present-injury arguments.”). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 139–40. 
 79.  See id. at 143–45 (explaining that when it is reasonable for a plaintiff to fear 
surveillance, there is standing if the measures the plaintiff took were a reasonable response to 
that fear). 
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of Plaintiff’s’ ethical responsibilities.80 Therefore, the court reasoned, 
in a reasonable effort to avoid those injuries, Plaintiffs avoided 
electronic communication or traveled long distances to meet with 
their clients.81 Because Plaintiffs had to choose between being 
monitored and incurring costs, the court found that they had the 
necessary “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” to 
warrant standing.82 
The Second Circuit further held that the standard for standing in 
issues of government surveillance programs follows traditional 
standing doctrine.83 It remarked that Laird did not create a stricter 
standard by declining to confer standing when the plaintiffs claimed 
that the surveillance program inflicted a “subjective chill” on 
plaintiffs’ rights.84 Instead, the Second Circuit stated that the Laird 
decision was limited to the facts presented in the case.85 The Second 
Circuit noted that the Laird plaintiffs did not have standing because 
they were not directly subject to the statute and they could not show 
that the surveillance program caused them to alter their conduct.86 
Unlike in Laird, Plaintiffs in the case at hand had shown that they had 
altered their conduct in response to the FAA.87 Because the court did 
not create a stricter standard for standing in Laird, the Second Circuit 
concluded that Laird did not preclude standing for Amnesty 
International and its fellow plaintiffs.88 
V. ARGUMENTS 
The main arguments presented by both parties focus on whether 
Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that they have suffered either a 
future injury or a present injury as a result of the FAA. The 
Government asserts that Plaintiffs have not proven future injury.89 
The Government argues that future injury claims are subject to an 
“imminence” standard and that the connection between the FAA and 
 
 80.  Id. at 143–44. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 144. 
 83.  Id. at 145. 
 84.  Id. at 146. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 146–47. 
 88.  Id. at 148–49. 
 89.  Brief for the Petitioners at 27, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, No. 11-1025 (U.S. July 26, 
2012). 
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Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries is insufficient to meet this standard.90 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue they can prove future injury 
because their injuries meet the standard of “reasonable likelihood of 
future harm.”91 
The Government also challenges the Second Circuit’s holding 
regarding present injury.92 The Government asserts that Plaintiffs’ 
injuries are not enough to satisfy the standing requirement because 
they are merely self-imposed responses to a “subjective chill” of 
Plaintiffs’ rights.93 Finally, the Government argues that a judicial 
remedy would not redress Plaintiffs’ injuries because the Government 
has other ways to monitor communications.94 Plaintiffs reply that their 
injuries are only self-inflicted because they had no other options to 
protect their communications.95 Plaintiffs also note that although 
other methods of surveillance are available to the Government, 
Plaintiffs need only prove that a judicial remedy would redress some 
of their injuries.96 
A. The Future Injury Claim 
1. The Government’s Attack on the Standard Adopted by the 
Second Circuit 
The Government argues that the Second Circuit adopted the 
wrong standard for injury-in-fact in cases of future injury.97 According 
to the Government, the standard adopted by the Second Circuit 
impermissibly allows standing to be based on “speculative assertions 
of possible future harm,”98 and the proper standard only allows 
standing when threatened future injury is imminent.99 An 
“imminence” standard requires Plaintiffs to prove that the acquisition 
of their communications is “certainly impending” as a result of the 
Government’s challenged action.100 Thus, the Government argues, the 
Second Circuit’s standard strays significantly from that imposed by 
 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 25. 
 92.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 89, at 35. 
 93.  Id. at 39–40. 
 94.  Id. at 45. 
 95.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 37. 
 96.  Id. at 49–50. 
 97.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 89, at 18. 
 98.  Id. at 19. 
 99.  Id. at 24 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). 
 100.  Id. at 19. 
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the Laird Court in a way that dilutes the requirement of an 
individualized factual presentation of the case;101 because the nexus 
between the statute and the injury to Plaintiffs is not sufficiently clear, 
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Government action will be too abstract 
and lacking a personal, factual basis.102 Abstract challenges to 
regulations cross over the fine line between personal challenges and 
advisory opinions.103 
The Government asserts that if the correct standard were applied, 
Plaintiffs’ injuries would be insufficient to warrant standing because 
their claimed future injury is based on mere conjecture about the 
possibility of any injury caused by future government action.104 
According to the Government, Plaintiffs are not the targets of the 
FAA and thus they cannot positively show that their communications 
are subject to certainly impending interception by surveillance 
authorized under the FAA.105 That the Government might target 
Plaintiffs’ foreign contacts and might accidentally intercept protected 
communications is pure speculation.106 It is also speculative, from the 
Government’s perspective, to claim that the Government will monitor 
Plaintiffs’ conversations using FAA authorization, as opposed to 
other authorized means of monitoring.107 Moreover, if the 
Government decides to use the FAA to monitor Plaintiffs’ foreign 
clients’ communications, it is unclear whether it would acquire FISA 
Court authorization.108 Because the Plaintiffs cannot show, with a 
sufficient level of certainty, that they are subject to any injury-in-fact, 
the Government believes that Plaintiffs’ future injury claims are 
insufficient for the purposes of standing.109 
2. Plaintiffs’ Reply 
Plaintiffs assert that the standard for future harm encompasses the 
threat of surveillance at issue in the case.110 They argue that the 
appropriate standard for injury-in-fact requires only a “reasonable 
 
 101.  Id. at 24. 
 102.  Id. at 35. 
 103.  See id. (explaining that one of the foundations of the American judicial system is its 
adversary nature and its general prohibition on advisory opinions). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 23. 
 106.  Id. at 30–31. 
 107.  Id. at 31–32. 
 108.  Id. at 33. 
 109.  Id. at 29. 
 110.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 24–25. 
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likelihood of future harm” and a “realistic danger” that injury will 
occur.111 This standard requires only that the plaintiff show a 
reasonable and substantial likelihood that his injury will come to 
pass.112 Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that requiring future plaintiffs to 
prove with immediate certainty that their communications are being 
monitored would effectively preclude any challenge to the FAA.113 
Foreign-intelligence monitoring is generally done in secret, without 
any prior announcement to the targeted persons. Accordingly, it is 
unlikely that any particular plaintiff would be able to show with 
individualized, immediate certainty that his communications are being 
monitored.114 
Plaintiffs assert that they have shown a sufficient threat of future 
harm to support injury-in-fact.115 They argue that it is undisputed that 
the Government uses the FAA to monitor foreign communications, 
and that Plaintiffs’ communications with their foreign clients are 
precisely the type and kind of information monitored under the 
FAA.116 Thus, the Government is likely to monitor Plaintiffs’ 
communications through the FAA surveillance process.117 If the FAA 
is used as envisioned, it is reasonable for Plaintiffs to fear that their 
communications with foreign contacts are reasonably likely to or are 
in realistic danger of being monitored.118 Thus, Plaintiffs argue, they 
have shown sufficient fear of future injury to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement.119 
 
 111.  Id. at 55–56 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 
U.S. 167, 190 (2000); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). 
 112.  See id. at 56 (challenging the Government’s argument that the standard of “certainly 
impending” requires more than a realistic threat, and arguing that the two standards have been 
used interchangeably to require a substantial likelihood of injury). 
 113.  Id. at 57. 
 114.  Id. at 57–58. 
 115.  Id. at 53–54. 
 116.  Id. at 53; see also id. at 30 (arguing that the changes brought by the FAA enable the 
Government to conduct broader monitoring programs that reach communications with 
individuals within the United States because the FAA does not require the Government to 
specify who will be monitored when applying for authorization). 
 117.  Id. at 53–54. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 54. 
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B. The Present Injury Claim 
1. The Government Challenges the Present Harm as Self-Inflicted 
and Subjective 
The Government contends that Plaintiffs do not have standing 
because self-imposed injuries are not sufficient to warrant Article III 
standing.120 Plaintiffs have failed to show that they have suffered 
injuries resulting from the Government’s challenged conduct.121 In 
fact, Plaintiffs can avoid the consequent expenditures without judicial 
intervention. Plaintiffs elected to spend that money on measures to 
avoid monitoring and could have, instead, chosen not to take those 
measures.122 Granting standing in this situation would treat those who 
choose to inflict injury on themselves more favorably than similarly 
situated parties who do not choose to self-inflict injuries, allowing 
uninjured individuals to manufacture injury-in-fact.123 
Moreover, the Government argues that Plaintiffs’ altered 
behavior, allegedly a reaction to their fear of future harm, is merely a 
“subjective chill” and not a sufficient substitute for the required 
injury-in-fact.124 The Government notes that Laird establishes that a 
plaintiff must show more than a “subjective chill” to fulfill the injury-
in-fact requirement in government surveillance cases.125 Because 
Plaintiffs cannot show that they feared imminent and concrete 
interception of their communications, they cannot show more than a 
subjective chill and, consequently, cannot point to any injury-in-fact.126 
The Government also contends, in the alternative, that even if self-
inflicted injury were sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement, Plaintiffs did not show that their injury could be 
redressed by a favorable court decision.127 Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries 
would have to be redressed by an injunction because the injuries stem 
from the threat that the Government may monitor their foreign 
contacts’ communications.128 However, the Government may choose 
not to monitor those communications via FAA authorization; rather, 
 
 120.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 89, at 38. 
 121.  Id. at 39. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 39–40. 
 125.  Id. at 40–41. 
 126.  Id. at 39. 
 127.  Id. at 44. 
 128.  Id. 
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the Government may choose any of the several alternative ways of 
monitoring foreign persons for foreign-intelligence purposes.129 It is 
therefore speculative to suggest that an injunction against the use of 
the FAA would prevent monitoring of Plaintiffs’ communications 
with foreign contacts.130 Plaintiffs have not shown that the judicial 
remedy sought would redress their injury.131 
2. Plaintiffs’ Reply 
Plaintiffs contend that the FAA is causing them “actual and 
ongoing professional and economic harm.”132 They argue that they 
have concrete rather than conjectural injuries because they have been 
forced to take costly measures (such as traveling abroad and avoiding 
telephone and email) to avert the risk of having their protected 
communications intercepted.133 The FAA has also impaired Plaintiffs’ 
ability to find additional contacts, witnesses, and sources abroad 
because such sources refuse to share information that they would 
otherwise share.134 Plaintiffs explain that the actions they have taken 
in response to the FAA were necessary and sometimes required by 
various professional rules of confidentiality.135 For example, journalist-
plaintiffs cannot maintain sources or gain new sources if there is the 
possibility that their conversations are being monitored.136 The 
attorney-plaintiffs are required by ABA Rules of Professional 
Conduct to protect their clients’ privacy at all costs; they cannot allow 
their communications with clients to be monitored.137 
Thus, their actions are only self-inflicted insofar as they could have 
chosen not to protect their communications and instead accept the 
damage to their personal and professional reputations.138 Plaintiffs 
contend that they have taken action to avoid concrete injury that 
would otherwise be inflicted by the Government through the 
challenged conduct. Such injury is sufficient for standing if the injury 
 
 129.  Id. at 45. 
 130.  Id. at 46. 
 131.  Id. at 46–47. 
 132.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 28–29. 
 133.  Id. at 27, 29. 
 134.  Id. at 29. 
 135.  See, e.g., id. at 34 (explaining attorney-plaintiffs’ ethical requirements under the Rules 
of Professional Conduct). 
 136.  Id. at 29. 
 137.  Id. at 34–35. 
 138.  Id. at 37. 
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is traceable to the statute.139 Because Plaintiffs’ injuries were a direct 
reaction to the FAAthe scope of the FAA allows government 
monitoring to reach Plaintiffs’ communications with sourcesthe 
economic injuries inflicted on Plaintiffs are directly traceable to the 
FAA.140 
Plaintiffs also contend that their injuries are justiciable under the 
Laird standard.141 They argue that Laird does not require plaintiffs 
who are attempting to prove substantiality of injury to show that their 
communications have already been monitored.142 The Laird plaintiffs 
lacked standing because their complaint challenged the existence of 
the government program without any demonstration of injury.143 The 
Laird Court explained that had plaintiffs alleged present objective 
harm, the Court might have found grounds for standing.144 Plaintiffs in 
the case at hand, however, took costly measures to avoid monitoring 
and therefore allege a present objective harm.145 
Moreover, Plaintiffs believe that their injuries would be redressed 
by a favorable judgment.146 Plaintiffs do not have to prove that the 
same injury cannot be inflicted by alternative monitoring methods. 
They simply must show that the judgment will redress “a discrete 
injury.”147 The Court has previously held that the standing requirement 
is satisfied when judgment only partially addresses the injury.148 In 
fact, it is enough that the relief sought would be a “first step” toward 
redressing the injury.149 Plaintiffs also argue that the FAA imposes 
 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 35–36. 
 141.  Id. at 46–47. 
 142.  Id. at 46. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 47–48. 
 146.  Id. at 48. 
 147.  Id. at 48–49 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982)). 
 148.  Id. at 49–50. Plaintiffs cite a series of cases in which plaintiffs sought to enjoin just one 
of multiple offenders from engaging in the offending conduct: Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497, 523–24 (2007) (holding that even though enjoining the EPA to regulate greenhouse 
emissions would not reverse global warming, it would be a step toward reducing global 
warming); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476 (1987) (holding that an injunction against the use 
of the words “political propaganda” would “at least partially address” the injury to the 
plaintiff); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 62 (1978) (holding that 
although the defendant was only one of many nuclear power plants that could cause 
radioactivity, the defendant was the one causing the plaintiffs’ fear of increased radioactivity in 
the air, water, and property). 
 149.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524 (explaining that resolution of the full injury 
may take incremental steps that address one problem at a time). 
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more burdens than other statutes authorizing electronic monitoring 
because it allows for sweeping and unrestricted monitoring without 
constant judicial review.150 The lack of judicial oversight increases 
Plaintiffs’ fear of monitoring and thereby increases the harm caused 
by the FAA. As a consequence, an injunction against the Government 
would directly redress Plaintiffs’ injuries.151 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The Court is likely to affirm the Second Circuit’s holding because 
Plaintiffs may have just enough “skin in the game” to survive standing 
scrutiny. Because the statute does not directly target Plaintiffs, the 
Court will only address the issue of whether Plaintiffs have provided 
sufficient factual proof evidencing the individualized effect of 
government monitoring under the FAA.152 
The Court is likely to hold that proof of injury-in-fact requires 
that Plaintiffs show that the FAA causes a reasonable fear of injury.153 
In cases of government surveillance, requiring that plaintiffs show that 
they have already been monitored would preclude adjudication of a 
statute’s constitutionality because the government is not likely to 
disclose specific targets of foreign-intelligence surveillance.154 Thus, 
Plaintiffs will not have to show that they will be injureda standard 
that is effectively impossible to meetrather, they need only show 
that it is reasonable for them to fear surveillance under the FAA.155 
Plaintiffs can show reasonable fear because the FAA has an 
expansive scope. Even communications that do not fall directly within 
the statute’s scope can still be unintentionally intercepted.156 The 
Court is likely to view the enumeration of the type of 
 
 150.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 51. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  The FAA was enacted to permit surveillance of communications outside the United 
States on matters of foreign intelligence. 154 CONG. REC. 769, 771 (2008). Since Plaintiffs are 
within the United States, they do not directly fall under the scope of the FAA. 
 153.  See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 n.8 (1983) (“It is the reality of the 
threat of repeated injury that is relevant . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
 154.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 57–58. 
 155.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 
(2000). 
 156.  See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(d)(1) (West 2012) (requiring that minimization 
procedures be set in place to ensure that there is no excessive unintentional monitoring of 
communications between persons in the United States). The very inclusion of minimization 
procedures indicates that the drafters of the FAA understood that some domestic 
communications will be monitored incident to the surveillance explicitly allowed by the statute. 
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communications that can be “picked up” as sufficient evidence of the 
individualized effect of the FAA on Plaintiffs, despite the fact that 
Plaintiffs are not the primary targets of the FAA. Thus, the Court will 
likely hold that because there is a “reasonable danger” that Plaintiffs’ 
communications will be monitored under the FAA, the threat of 
future injury suffices to establish injury-in-fact. 
To prove ongoing injury, the Court is likely to require that 
Plaintiffs show that, faced with the threat of injury, they took action to 
avoid the injury. Plaintiffs have shown that in order to avoid 
monitoring, they modified their conduct and, as a result, incurred 
costs.157 Although Plaintiffs’ injuries were arguably “self-inflicted,” 
those injuries were the result of a Hobson’s choice: Plaintiffs had to 
either incur the costs of avoiding FAA monitoring or decline to take 
measures to protect communications and suffer any resulting 
reputational and professional consequences.158 When a plaintiff is 
forced to make a choice between relinquishing a protected 
constitutional right on the one hand, and a less grievous self-inflicted 
injury on the other, the plaintiff should have the right to challenge the 
offending statute.159 
Moreover, the Court is likely to hold that Laird does not preclude 
justiciability for the case at hand. Although Laird held that plaintiffs 
did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a 
government surveillance program because their injury was only a 
“subjective chill” of their rights, it is unlikely that the Court will hold 
that Laird created a new standard for standing. The issue in Laird 
pertained to two of the fundamental requirements of standing: (1) 
whether plaintiffs could show any injury-in-fact, and (2) whether the 
injury was incurred as a result of the challenged government 
conduct.160 Although Laird did address the issue of future or “fear-
based” injuries, it arguably did not heighten the existing standing 
standards for injuries arising from a government surveillance 
program.161 Laird merely applied, albeit narrowly, the established 
 
 157.  See Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 29 (noting, for example, that Plaintiffs 
travelled abroad to gather information instead of using phone or email). 
 158.  Id. at 37. 
 159.  See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476–77 (1987) (holding that a plaintiff who faces the 
choice of refraining from a protected action or suffering injury has the right to challenge the 
government action in question). 
 160.  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1972). 
 161.  See Brian Calabrese, Fear-Based Standing: Cognizing an Injury-in-Fact, 603 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1445, 1456–57 (2011) (explaining that Laird is the leading case on fear-based 
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requirements of standing in the context of government surveillance 
programs. 
Additionally, the Court is likely to hold that Plaintiffs have shown 
that their injury can be redressed by a favorable judgment. 
Established standing doctrine does not require a plaintiff to show that 
the remedy sought will perfectly redress all of his injuries.162 The 
plaintiff need only show that the injunction will provide some 
measure of relief.163 Plaintiffs have shown that they fear monitoring 
because of the FAA’s extraordinary breadth.164 Thus, requiring that 
the Government be prohibited from using the FAA to conduct 
electronic surveillance would provide some measure of relief. 
Additionally, to deny standing because the Government has other 
means available to infringe on Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights165 would 
insulate any duplicative government programs from any 
constitutional challenge.166 Thus, the Court is likely to hold that 
Plaintiffs have fulfilled the requirements of standing. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs here may have just enough personal interest to 
satisfy the standing inquiry. Plaintiffs can show future injury based on 
a standard that requires a reasonable fear of injury because the FAA 
is broad enough to encompass Plaintiffs’ communications. Plaintiffs 
can also show that their “self-inflicted” injuries were undertaken 
based on a Hobson’s choice: either failing to fulfill their professional 
obligations by allowing government monitoring or incurring costs to 
avoid them. Moreover, issues of causality and redressability are 
unlikely to preclude standing because intervening steps and partial 
redressability are not factors that defeat standing in this case. 
However, this will be a close decision that will, at least in subtext, 
require the Court to balance the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights with 
the Government’s duty to protect its citizens. 
 
injuries as injuries-in-fact in all government actions). 
 162.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523–24 (2007); see also Friends of the Earth v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 186 (2000) (“To the extent that [sanctions] 
encourage defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them from committing future 
ones, they afford redress to citizen plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury as a 
consequence of ongoing unlawful conduct.”). 
 163.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523–24. 
 164.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 51. 
 165.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 89, at 45. 
 166.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 26. 
